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PART 1 BACKGROUND AND THE REFORMS 
1.1. Introduction  
The context of collective bargaining in Spain was considered by some to be one of the 
strongest in Europe by virtue of its coverage, although the question of implementation has 
been an issue.  Since the development of the liberal democratic political system in the late 
1970s – after the end of the Franco dictatorship (1939-75) – there had been an ongoing 
extension of collective bargaining. Forms of pseudo-bargaining had existed at various levels 
during the latter years of the Francoist dictatorship, albeit led and managed by management 
and the state who dominated over a state organised trade union (Martinez Lucio, 1998; 
Martinez Lucio and Hamann, 2009).  However, there were instances where management did 
negotiate with certain elements of the emerging independent labour movement which, while 
formerly still clandestine, did manage to engage with certain ‘works council style’ elections 
in some instances. With the advent of democracy and the consolidation of various labour 
rights through the Worker’s Statutes and Organic Law of Trade Union Freedoms the pattern 
of bargaining in companies and workplaces became normalised. Local provincial bargaining 
for a range of sectors such as the construction and the hospitality sectors allowed for the 
terms of conditions of various workers in small to medium sized firms to be collectively 
determined even where labour representation was weaker: such smaller firms relied on higher 
level agreements (Sissons et al, 1991).  In addition, the steady emergence of a sector level of 
bargaining in such sectors as the chemical industry managed to establish a basis for a more 
articulated structure of bargaining with minimums being established for specific sets of 
workers (Hamann, 2012: 150-154).  
Whilst national agreements and pacts of a tripartite nature were high in number and varied 
according to scope, there was also, according to some, a continuous dialogue at the higher 
level which ideologically or strategically framed the local practice of social dialogue 
(Guillen, et al 2008).  The number of pacts on a range of issues since the late 1970s indicates 
for some a continuity in dialogue at the level of state.   There has been much discussion as to 
whether this level of bargaining really did effectively impact on the structure of bargaining as 
the pacts were more concerned with reforms and modernisation processes in terms of labour 
relations on issues such as learning.  The frameworks for setting collective increases in pay at 
peak level did exist, with the overall changes in the content of bargaining, especially pay, 
being established through national bi-partite agreements at specific times; but whether this 
national level activity on specific elements of the employment relation was acting as a vehicle 
for sustaining a systematic dialogue beyond specific pacts and becoming embedded in 
systematic neo-corporatist structures is questionable (Martinez Lucio, 1998). However, a 
culture social dialogue between the majority unions, the main employer federations and the 
state was apparent, which during key moments of political difference was invoked to stabilise 
the politics of industrial relations (Roca, 1983). 
Thus, union involvement in policy making has depended on the government’s willingness to 
negotiate with unions and employer (Martínez Lucio 1998). In addition, crucial parts of the 
government’s economic, social, and labour market policy agenda were not negotiated with 
the unions but instead directly passed, often against the vociferous opposition of the unions 
(Hamann, 2012). There are two views regarding the tradition of social pacts. The first tends 
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to see it as a strategic process that aims to legitimate government decisions and placate 
organised labour on a range of issues: however, this has not led to deep institutional relations 
over longer term issues in economic and social policy (Martínez Lucio 1998, 2000; Hamann 
2012). That is not to imply that complex informal processes and modes of information 
sharing are not possible within tripartite bodies such as the Social and Economic Council 
(Consejo Económico y Social). Hence, a series of ongoing dialogues on a range of issues has 
existed; yet they are increasingly focused on the supply-side dimensions of the economy and 
less on the demand side (Martínez Lucio 1998). For some, marketisation and strains on the 
political exchanges in Spain have been extensive. Yet others (Guillén et al. 2008) - as we 
have argued above - suggest that the sheer amount of agreements both nationally and 
regionally cannot be regarded as merely being minimal or symbolic: As Encarnación (2003: 
8) argues: ‘… Spain is deservedly regarded as the paradigmatic model of a pacted transition 
… every kind of pact has been attempted in Spain: from secretive gentlemen's agreements to 
grand social and economic accords enjoying tremendous public fanfare.’ In addition, the 
impact of co-ordinated national bargaining and political exchanges has affected wage 
increases across time, suggesting an ongoing national dialogue even if the forums are not 
always transparent, continuous and concrete (see Martinez Lucio and Hamann 2009 for a 
more extensive discussion). 
During the 1980s through to the late 00’s collective bargaining was able to cover circa 80% 
of the workforce. In 2005 for example, 4,647 collective agreements were signed covering 
8,745,700 workers (Consejo Económico y Social 2005:330). From 1997-2004 there were 
between 3,700 and 4,200 agreements annually, and between 7 million to 8 million workers 
covered. This covered a range of topics related to pay, working hours, and training: although 
one of the criticisms concerning collective bargaining is that beyond the larger firms there 
was a tendency for SMEs to rely on either national sector level agreements or provincial 
sector agreements for their wage increases and working hours in terms of content, and rarely 
engaged with broader issues and collective bargaining content.  
 
Underpinning this relative stability and consistency was the role of the two major trade union 
confederations, the CCOO and UGT, which had, since the late 1980s, begun to work more 
closely together in terms of their strategies towards the development of collective bargaining.   
These trade unions receive the large part of the vote in the trade union elections which every 
four years determine the nature of works councils and individual workplace representatives.  
These competitive elections have tended to see these unions increase the share of union 
delegates they have in such bodies from circa 55% in 1978 to 75% in 2007 (Beneyto, 2008). 
As stated, such elections have normally seen over 80% of the workforce vote, so one can 
detect a strong institutional underpinning to the process of social dialogue. Yet low union 
membership density - which have been between 10 and 20 percent over the past thirty years - 
and related financial difficulties have led to a concern with the ‘crisis of representation’ in 
Spanish unions. Jordana (1996) has argued that trade union membership in the 1970s has 
been significantly overstated; thus the picture of subsequent decline is misleading. As in 
France, formal union ‘representativeness’ for the purposes of reaching collective agreements 
and for participation in tripartite bodies, is judged according to the results in the workplace 
elections (see below) in which all employees, whether union members or not, are entitled to 
vote. Thus the Spanish union movement has been labelled a ‘voters’ trade unionism’ rather 
than a ‘members’ trade unionism’ (Martin Valverde 1991: 24-5).  In other words, 
organisational influence depends on electoral success as much as on membership figures.  In 
these terms, the main Spanish unions appear to be more favourably regarded and more widely 
supported by workers than their membership figures might indicate.   
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Yet throughout the 1990s onwards there emerged a political discourse on the right and in 
neo-liberal leaning parts of the Socialist Party which questioned the actual effectiveness and 
perceived ‘rigidities’ of collective bargaining structures and labour market regulation, 
especially in terms of employment termination.   This narrative built on the centrist-market 
leaning politics of the Gonzalez Socialist government in the 1980s and early 1990s which 
tended to lean towards a politics of privatisation and limited social regulation and investment 
(Smith, 1990).  The Spanish labour market had adopted certain features of labour market 
regulation from the previous regimes. These features were not reflective of any progressive or 
any pro-labour nature of the previous regime or of the social elites driving the transition to 
democracy, but emerged from a symbolic contract with the working class given the nature of 
its exploitation in political terms.  It was a system of political quiescence which put in place a 
series of regulatory characteristics in terms of work organisations which elites felt would 
placate the need for any alternative or independent forms of labour representation (see 
Foweraker, 1989).  It is essential we understand this historical context: 
‘… regardless of this forced internal and external dispersal of trade unionists the state could 
not allow a vacuum to develop in terms of the industrial relations system. Coercion no matter 
how extensive could be but one part of a politics of industrial relations and the regulation of 
employment in favour of employers and capital more generally…  In terms of representation, 
the Organización Sindical Española was developed.  This ‘vertical union’ brought worker 
representatives and employer representatives into the national level of this state body down to 
the regional and sectoral level (Ellwood, 1976).  … Secondly, a system of ‘representation’ 
was developed within the workplace and in companies.  In effect, this system of representation 
was neither independent nor free of state influence but began to operate albeit on the terms of 
employer interests.  Thirdly, and more importantly in terms of its later effect and ongoing 
influence until recently, the state passed what are termed labour ordinances, a set of detailed 
regulations of employment categories and classifications to some extent.  They configure the 
position and jobs of individuals and whilst employers maybe did not always take them 
seriously the ordinances assisted in the organising of the employment relations and the need 
for regularity and certainty – albeit one that was state directed and for the most part in 
favoured employers.  Even employment termination became regulated in terms of how it was 
processed and remunerated with relatively high levels for redundancy although there is a 
question mark over whether these were consistently paid’ (Martinez Lucio and Hamman: 
2009:126).   
These legacies, and the manner in which they were crystallised within contemporary 
industrial relations, were beginning to be seen as problematic.  There had been reforms of the 
labour ordinances through a range of discussions during the Gonzalez governments (from 
introducing flexibility in the labour market through fixed term contracts to discussions 
regarding the reform of the collective bargaining system, which was seen as ‘too 
centralized’). The cost of dismissals for employers were steadily reformed and slightly 
reduced as well prior to the 2008 crisis. Throughout the 1990s a series of reforms to these 
features of the employment relation were enacted – partly through social pacts - as the cost of 
labour dismissals to employers was steadily decreased through a series of agreements and the 
reforms of the labour ordinances (Sala, 2013). Yet there was an emerging political discourse 
which argued for a more robust questioning of these regulation and which was tied to a 
growing ‘Tea Party’ style influence within the Spanish right, even if during the 1996-2004 
the Aznar Conservative Popular Party (PP) government’s relations with trade unions had in 
policy terms been more than reasonable (partly buffered by the use of extensive training 
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funds from the state which were delivered and administered in large part by trade unions and 
employer federations) (Rigby, 2010).  
The role of sector level bargaining began to emerge as a point of contention for some on the 
right of the political spectrum. National and provincial sector levels of bargaining were the 
main point of reference within the system due to the large number of small and medium sized 
firms who did not have their own agreements (Sanz de Miguel, 2012). Some saw the sector 
level of bargaining as creating a degree of inflexibility within the system of labour 
productivity and relations, and of obscuring the actual weaknesses of the system providing 
trade unions with the appearance of more influence than what they actually had. It was seen 
by some members and officials of various employer organisations as a way of subsidising and 
organisationally carrying the trade union movement (interview data from authors).  
Hence, well before the crisis we begin to see the advanced embryo of a more affirmative neo-
liberal critique of the system of regulation in terms of its coverage.  The system of industrial 
relations regulation was seen as being a framework of control which according to the political 
right stalled productivity increases. This narrative resurfaced in the post 2008 period 
especially towards the end of the Socialist Zapatero government (2004-11) and current 
Conservative PP government which fixed its sights on the question of labour cost as an 
impediment to economic renewal. We will return to this later.  
The crisis was therefore steadily linked to this question of labour in ideological terms. 
However the origins of the crisis are more complex.  The first is that the housing market in 
Spain which has been viewed as a major vehicle of economic development was becoming 
increasingly volatile and open to speculation, being partly fuelled by economic monetary 
unions and it’s relaxing of existing financial regulation and constraints in the sector 
(Conefrey and Gerald, 2010).  The emphasis on the construction industry as an absorber of 
labour and human resources was important in including a range of working class 
constituencies and new migrants, and in generating state revenue from the building, sale and 
employment aspects of this dimension.  A model of growth emerged that was premised on the 
ongoing development of this sector. In addition, the absence of a proactive industrial policy 
in relation to manufacturing and related research and development strategies during the 1980s 
onwards were seen to contribute to a pattern of growth linked to the growth of, and links 
between, the finance, housing and hospitality sectors.  The financing of this growth through a 
highly de-regulated mortgage system and loan system was linked to remuneration systems 
within the banking sector for elite employees and created an unregulated loosening of 
finance.   
This was also a state that had– since the 1970s - under both sets of democratic governments 
be it right or left begun to de-industrialise Spain, which had previously become a major 
manufacturing driven country in terms of automobiles, steel, white goods, and other related 
sectors. The nature of growth had shifted from value added production to a speculative 
property market and financially driven model.  This created a state reliant on potentially 
volatile taxation income.  A further narrative of a critical nature is that Spain’s position in the 
Euro had meant that it had entered at too high a rate and was unable to use its external 
economic and exchange policy to readjust in the face of changes and crisis. There were 
discussions in certain circles about withdrawal from the Euro, or of discussions of scenarios 
for a potential withdrawal, but this was limited and did not really become a general 
discussion. The question of the Euro and its regulation has not been a central feature of 
formal political discourse to the extent one would have imagined compared to some other 
contexts.    
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However, the right in Spanish politics have pointed to a specific set of structures that were 
also unable to sustain the nature of economic development in terms of the regional structure 
of the state and the manner in which debt had accumulated at that level. During the early 00s 
the public deficit and debt was fairly low and within the classic Maastricht criteria. Yet this 
situation began to steadily unsettle and eventually deteriorated in the past ten or so years.  
The right thus turned its focus on the structure of the state and the labour market as a vehicle 
of reform partly legitimated by the fixation with the ‘cost of labour dismissal’ and the 
perceived ‘archaic’ system of labour relations and bargaining: this was further supported 
through references to the discourse of de-regulation that emerged from within the European 
Union and various international financial ranking agencies.     
Returning to industrial relations, one major point of contention was the failure to renovate 
collective agreements. Many agreements were not always re-negotiated and re-signed: 
instead they were automatically revised meaning that certain indicators within that agreement 
would be adjusted in line with inflation, for example. In 2010 of the 5,067 agreements 
registered 3,607 were revised having been signed earlier (Fulton, 2013). In effect, the failure 
to sustain a social dialogue within the workplace meant that the process of collective 
bargaining was slowing down and becoming truncated such that it relied on a process of 
automatic renewal in the absence of any new agreements between the different parts of the 
employment relations.  For many on the right of the political spectrum this was an indication 
of the growing bureaucratic inertia within labour relations and its dysfunctional qualities. In 
effect, industrial relations were seen to be failing as a workplace vehicle for dialogue 
according to this narrative: it was viewed as being out of sync with the needs of the economy 
and in that respect a ‘relic’ of a previous regime of regulation.  This led to the stigmatising of 
the labour relations and regulation and to ironic association - discursively - with the 
dictatorial legacy of the past.   What we therefore witness is an anti-industrial relations 
narrative emerging on the right that predates the crisis but is accelerated by it (Gonzalez and 
Martinez Lucio, 2013).  
This narrative was bolstered by very high levels of unemployment which brought to the fore 
the failures of labour market processes (although what is the cause of this unemployment is 
the subject of much debate).  Spain has had one of the highest levels of unemployment in 
Europe since the early 1980s although the extent of hidden and undeclared labour may have 
meant the figure was lower. In 2007 the level of unemployment was just over 8% which was 
considered to be low given previous levels, however by 2013 the figure was 27% (Statista, 
2014). This was, according to the left, due to the failure of the economic growth model (as 
discussed earlier) but for the right, which won the elections in 2011, it was the outcome of an 
archaic system of labour regulation. In 2012 unemployment for those under 25 was 55% 
(Eurostat, 2013). This engendered an insider-outsider discourse which viewed the ‘insiders’ 
as being protected by the nature of redundancy legislation and the processes of collective 
bargaining.   
1.2. The Processes of Reform  
The crisis of Spain was initially responded to through a strategy that assumed a partially neo-
Keynesian character. Initially a series of public works programmes were developed by the 
Zapatero socialist government (2004-11) during its latter years from 2008 and 2009 which 
emphasised state led employment and injections of income into infrastructure projects: it was 
called ‘Plan E’. This was a short term reaction framed by the belief that the crisis was 
temporary. This short-termist Keynesian moment was not in keeping with the neo-liberal 
‘continuity’ politics of Zapatero which maintained a marketised economic policy and did not 
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develop the public sector or the role of state extensively after the previous conservative 
government: some scholars such as Field (2009) have considered that this government did not 
depart from the economic policies of the previous governments (which were mainly 
neoliberal), despite the underlying structural problems of the economic growth model.  
Zapatero’s social agenda was mainly focused on social values and questions related to liberal 
individualism. Hence Plan E was a short term response to declining purchasing trends and 
increasing unemployment after 2008.  In addition, towards the final year or so of Zapatero’s 
government, policy became couched in terms of public expenditure cuts and increases in 
indirect taxation: this has been a major feature of the later right wing government’s critique 
of the left in that it began to move steadily towards a politics of austerity before the 2011 
election meaning any critique of the right after 2011 could be deemed to be unjustified. In 
addition, the question of labour reforms, as we will discuss below in terms of employment 
contracts, was propagated in part during the last two years of the Socialist government. It 
attempted to create a series of pacts on employment and flexibility within the labour market 
emphasising the need for labour reforms.  The election of the PP government in 2011 brought 
forth a more austere politics of austerity based on public sector expenditure cuts, reductions 
in public sector incomes, and the containment of future public expenditure projects through 
privatisation proposals especially in the health sector and aspects of the public media.   
This strategy was developed through the majority presence the PP had in the Spanish 
parliament which meant that the government was able to vote through changes irrespective of 
the level of parliamentary opposition. In addition, it used a series of laws to change the nature 
of employment regulation and did so in a forceful and direct manner but as we will show 
below this was not without recourse to a series of negotiations with organised labour; 
although trade unions did use mobilisations through a series of general one day strikes during 
this period. However, according to Gonzalez Benega and Luque Balbona (2013) industrial 
disputes had been part of a complex interplay of political signals and mobilisations which 
were used to punctuate an ongoing dialogue between the state and labour throughout the 
previous periods of social concertation in the 1990s and up until 2011.  These mobilisations 
were clearly becoming important to reclaiming much needed public space and legitimacy for 
unions after a spate of popular social movements had linked them to the apparatus of the state 
due to the emphasis that unions placed on servicing and not.  Yet, the growing exhaustion of 
popular mobilisation in the wake of a government that has the institutional means to effect 
reform has led to a steady reformulation of priorities within organised labour.  The systematic 
deployment of coercive features of the state in relation to social and economic conflict has 
been apparent and the circumscribing of social and political rights (in terms of the re-defining 
of the nature of assemblies in public space and the limitations on the specific locations of 
mobilisations and demonstrations) have brought forth a more co-ordinated authoritarian 
character.  
Furthermore, the link with the ‘troika’ and the key institutional aspects of the European 
Union and the International Monetary Fund, have been significant.  The imposition of a series 
of recommended changes to the ambit and reach of the state from external agencies, and the 
detailed recommendations of the way finance policy was to be conducted, were utilised by 
the government in Spain as not just a point of legitimacy for its changes but also as a way in 
which to castigate the previous government and civil society for its ‘failures’ to ‘constrain’ 
the ‘negative’ economic behaviours of Spain. This political flink with external agencies was 
paralleled by a growing shift in the policy discourses of the labour market and labour 
regulation. The fundamental obsession with labour costs and the impact of supposed 
difficulties in making people redundant has created a view that the problem emerges from a 
protected and highly regulated workforce: ‘The IMF assessment is certain to come as a 
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disappointment to the Rajoy government, which pushed through an ambitious labour market 
reform last year that made it cheaper for companies to fire workers and easier to depart from 
collective wage deals. Though the Fund praises the reform, saying it has had “some positive 
effects”, it warns that more drastic action is needed. It wants wages and work arrangements to 
be made more flexible still, and calls on Madrid to end the much-criticised “duality” between 
temporary and permanent work contracts. “The reform effort must continue,” said James 
Daniel, the Fund’s mission chief for Spain, in a conference call with journalists’ (Buck, 
Financial Times, 2013). This demonizing of the Spanish worker has been a part of the 
ideology of the external agencies who have continuously applied pressure on the government 
to pursue labour market reforms (Fernandez Rodriguez and Martinez Lucio, 2013). This 
ideology links those external interests with those of the internal market facing reformers 
(particular groups of employers and orthodox economists), paving the road for the reforms to 
come in the labour market legislation. 
 
1.3. The Substantive Reforms in Labour Relations  
 
As mentioned before, ‘rigidity’ has been considered to be the main problem in the Spanish 
labour market, and in every economic crisis this discourse has reappeared, influencing the 
development of specific measures deployed to introduce more flexibility (Fernández 
Rodríguez and Martínez Lucio, 2013). Given the fact that the current crisis has been 
considered by most of the media and analysts as the worst since the 1929 crash, it was not 
surprising that the advocates of liberalization of the labour market would call for drastic 
changes in labour legislation in order not only to respond to the crisis, but to frame a new 
landscape in industrial relations where deregulation would lead to greater economic 
efficiency and employment growth. 
 
Indeed, the Spanish economy has been facing strong challenges during the crisis. During the 
years 2008–11, the economic crisis was particularly intense in Spain and there was a period 
of job destruction.  The year 2009 can be easily considered one of the worst years in Spanish 
history in terms of economic activity and unemployment. It is estimated that during 2009 
more than one and a half million lost their jobs, increasing the number of unemployed to 
more than 2 million since 2007. This represented a major challenge for the Spanish economy 
whose economic model (based in part on a speculative construction sector and related 
services) had collapsed (López and Rodríguez, 2011). The beginning of the sovereign debt 
crisis in Greece during the autumn of 2009 increased the external pressures from financial 
markets and European partners, and soon the Spanish government was put under severe 
pressure, forcing the Zapatero to develop a U-turn in the anti-crisis policies developed until 
that moment as stated above (Meardi, 2012). A set of unprecedented political measures were 
carried out to avoid a debt crisis. Cutting public wages and freezing them for the following 
years, and trimming social expenditure, were coupled with reforms related to labour market 
regulation that have had a very strong impact upon collective bargaining.  
 
In this section we will turn our attention to the main reforms in the field of collective 
bargaining during the last couple of years. There is still not much literature about these 
reforms at the moment of writing in English except for occasional papers (Meardi, 2012; 
Molina and Miguélez, 2013). However, there is an increasing body of work on the matter in 
Spanish, although slightly biased towards Labour Law studies with very few sociological or 
industrial relations research based papers.  
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To give an overview of the reforms, we will divide this section in three main parts. In the 
first, the main features of the Spanish collective bargaining system will be described in order 
to understand the key points of the reforms, which will themselves be described in the second 
section. Finally, the third section will be devoted to evaluating the scope of the changes 
undertaken during the last years. 
 
A brief description of the collective bargaining system 
 
As mentioned before, the Spanish model of industrial relations situates collective agreements 
at the core of its employment relations. Labour rights are specified in the Workers’ Statute 
where trade unions are deemed the key actors in the development of collective agreements. 
Those labour agreements cover a wide range of issues in different sectors and different 
companies, shaping the employment conditions of a substantial part of the Spanish workforce 
(Nonell et al., 2006). This covers aspects such as the way wages are fixed, work and 
employment conditions, and the general regulation of collective relationships at different 
levels (including health and safety at the workplace, training, measures to fight against the 
dualization of the labour market, etc.).  
 
The basic principles of the system could be summarized in three points:  
 
a) Legitimacy of the "most representative union" to participate, an issue that depends on 
support in the works council elections, not from the number of affiliated workers. This means 
that nationally only CCOO and UGT are deemed to be the "most representative unions", 
accompanied by some Basque and Galician smaller unions in those autonomous states. 
 
b) The principle of statutory extension. This establishes that any collective agreement higher 
than the company level must be applied to all companies and to all workers forming part of 
the geographical and industry level in question. It is irrelevant whether they have participated 
or not in the bargaining process. This sets the limits for further agreements, thus guaranteeing 
a certain set of minimums in the company level bargaining. 
 
c) “Ultra-activity” refers to the following principle: if an agreement has not been renewed, it 
remains valid after its expiry.  
 
Negotiations take place usually between trade unions and employers’ associations. However, 
in specific cases they are also sometimes signed by the government in order to provide a add 
an element of legitimacy. Different sets of dialogues may occur at four different levels: 
national, regional, industry, and company/organisation level, and as mentioned before they 
cover a broad range of issues such as training, job classification, sickness, maternity 
arrangements, and health and safety. Since 2005 there was also a sharp increase in the 
number of agreements covering employment, particularly regarding an increase of permanent 
employees at the workplaces. The results of the specific negotiations had effects on all 
employees in the area that the collective agreement was covering. Therefore, if a certain 
agreement was reached in a specific sector of the economy and in a province, then the 
companies of that sector which were based in that province would be subjected to those 
labour conditions: although as stated above what aspects were adhered to varied. The 
negotiations were driven by employers and works councils but, at the higher levels beyond 
the organization, the agreement could only be signed by representatives of the "most 
representative unions" at the national or regional level. The law describes how negotiations 
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are to be conducted and the composition of both sides. Agreements tended to last two years 
or more, and almost invariably started from the beginning of the year (though negotiations 
could begin anytime during the year). It is important to notice that lower level agreements 
used to include a clause providing additional payments if inflation exceeded an agreed level.  
 
During the years 1997-2007, the Spanish economy experienced a boom that helped increase 
GDP and the number of people employed (up to 20 million people), leaving the 
unemployment rate at a historical low rate of 7.95% by 2007. It also witnessed an expansion 
of collective bargaining. By 2008 the data from the Estadística de Convenios Colectivos 
(Collective Agreements Statistics) showed a number of 5,987 collective agreements under 
which 1,605,195 companies and 11,968,148 workers were covered by jointly agreed 
employment conditions. This has been considered a historical maximum (Aragón et al., 
2009). However, since 2009 the numbers began to collapse drastically. By 2013, the number 
of collective agreements dropped to 1,963 (provisional data of February 2014), with 
approximately 5,892,600 workers covered. This represents a drastic change in Spanish 
industrial relations: according to the official statistics, in just 5 years the number of collective 
agreements decreased significantly to little more than one third of the total number signed in 
2008, covering less than half of the previous number of workers (the number of people 
working has also decreased notably, with the Spanish unemployment rate being around 25%). 
 
We mentioned that the emergence of post-1975 industrial relations in Spain was still under 
the influence of a political project shaped around the construction of a positive notion of 
labour citizenship. The Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Workers’ Statute) and some additional 
laws were inspired by social-democratic perpsectives (Alonso, 2007). Nevertheless, the 
deepening nature of the crisis during the 1980s, the rise of unemployment and the new 
policies adopted by the PSOE to join the European Economic Community (EEC) had led to a 
change of direction that remained stable as a discourse for the rest of the democratic period. 
As was mentioned before, some orthodox economists from the Bank of Spain started to 
suggest a number of possible reforms as they perceived that the automatic pay increases 
negotiated in collective agreements were a threat not only to controlling inflation but to the 
competitiveness of Spanish firms and corporations, thus highlighting the rigidity of the 
model. For instance Bentolila and Jimeno (2002) claimed that the Spanish economy was 
approaching a new scenario which required a drastic reform of the Spanish industrial 
relations – and saw the sets of rights discussed above as a political compromise of the 
transition period to democracy that was now obsolete in a more developed modern 
democracy.  
 
Such a new economic scenario could be defined by the following trends: 
 
a) The increasing demand of increasingly skilled workers had effects on the way negotiations 
were conducted, with a ‘dualization’ of the Spanish labour market in terms of skills. Pay 
increases and decisions taken at a higher level than the organization would have the effect of 
raising the unemployment rate of non-skilled workers it was argued.   
 
b) Spain had joined the EU internal market which implied freedom of movement for goods, 
capital and labour. This implied important challenges for unskilled workers who faced 
competition from immigrants from other parts of Europe (e.g. Eastern European countries) 
and beyond.   
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c) Spain had also joined the Economic and Monetary Union and therefore had adopted the 
Euro as its new currency. Therefore, the economic policies could no longer rely on its 
monetary policies. Currency devaluation had been a salient policy during the democratic 
period, and had helped to boost the Spanish economy after the 1993 crisis. However, joining 
the euro had become an absolute priority for Mr. Aznar’s PP government, who claimed that it 
was essential for situating Spain among its European peers in terms of economic 
modernization: and it was known that further adjustments in the future might be perceived as 
a direct impoverishment of the working conditions of Spanish people (through salary cuts) 
once devaluations could no longer be used. According to Bentolila and Jimeno (2002), to 
avoid situations of high unemployment and slow economic growth more flexible salaries and 
higher productivity would be required.  
 
d) The increasing heterogeneity in every sector of production meant that not every company 
showed equal levels of competitiveness, some being more technology-based and innovative 
than others. Established sector level arrangements in regulation did not take this fact into 
account, leading many companies to face problems in terms of rigidities and lack of 
flexibility. 
 
From the beginning of the nineties onwards, employers’ associations expressed their 
discontent about the way collective bargaining had been established and the governments of 
the PSOE and PP began to respond. The labour market reform of 1994 had included elements 
which implied a certain decentralization of industrial relations. They de-regulated certain 
aspects of labour regulation and decentralized collective agreements (where regional 
agreements could prevail over national ones, an important issue given the disparity of levels 
of economic development among different regions). It also allowed the possibility to include 
clauses that would leave open the possibility of a ‘descuelgue salarial’ (a company has the 
possibility of not adhering to pay agreements in the sector if it has a problematic financial 
context). However, few measures were taken in that direction and Spain joined the Euro with 
a system of collective bargaining was criticized by some segments of employers and 
orthodox academics close to their positions. Their view was linked to the free dismissal 
discourse we mentioned earlier (Fernández Rodríguez and Martínez Lucio, 2013).  
 
Hence the crisis was seen as the perfect excuse to trigger the reforms. Given the traditional 
low investment in technology or R&D by Spanish companies, it was clear that salaries 
(understood broadly as labour costs) would be at the forefront of future adjustments, and the 
crisis has proved this according to some. According to such scholars, Spain has undertaken a 
policy of internal devaluation to exit the crisis, and labour market reforms have been 
launched to achieve that goal. 
 
The nature of the collective bargaining reforms  
 
The Spanish government responded to the crisis through several measures, particularly labour 
market reforms. These newest reforms are linked to the new spirit of austerity that has 
impregnated Spanish economic policies since 2010, exemplified by Mr. Rodríguez 
Zapatero’s decisions from May 2010 to the end of his government, and later on by Mr. 
Rajoy’s conservative government. This period has been based on the adoption of a more 
unilateral approach to policymaking from the government, particularly the PP government 
(Molina and Miguélez, 2013). Three reforms were launched in little more than a year and a 
half by the two cabinets that have run the country during the crisis, all of them by-passing 
social partnership to a great extent. 
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In 2010, in a context of a deep economic crisis and a certain panic derived from the Greek 
debt crisis and the interest rate rise of Spanish bonds, a first labour market reform was passed. 
It complemented the first austerity measures announced in May in parliament by Mr. 
Rodríguez Zapatero’s government (Azpitarte Sánchez, 2011). Published in the official State 
bulletin in June 2010 just a few weeks after the drastic reorientation of the economic policies, 
and reformed slightly in a second version in September of the same year: it was justified 
highlighting the extraordinary circumstances of the crisis. The negative evolution of the 
economic indicators was considered to be not only the result of the financial crisis, but also 
the outcome of imbalances and problems of the Spanish labour market and industrial 
relations. In this sense, the government seemed to accept the recommendations by the Bank 
of Spain, whose leader had advocated for a reform in that direction, and various employers’ 
associations. 
 
This reform covered many issues. The most relevant ones for our topic were the following: 
 
a) It lowered dismissal costs and broadened the notion of ‘objective causes’ for firms to 
justify redundancies.  
 
b) It also accepted that companies and employees could reach agreements in which they 
would voluntarily place themselves outside the framework of collective bargaining 
agreements at the sector level, easing the preconditions for the descuelgue salarial.  
 
c) It added a number of incentives for promoting indefinite (permanent) contracts. 
 
d) It increased the participation of temporary work agencies (which had been steadily 
evolving albeit through a regulated framework, but which was now being pushed more 
rigorously).  
 
The reform was met with criticism by the trade unions, and a general strike took place in 
September 2010. However, this did not influence the policies of the government. The reform 
paved the way for greater decentralization within industrial relations and reinforced a certain 
neoliberal spirit that had been present in PSOE’s policies since Felipe González’s leadership 
as mentioned earlier. There were expectations that the reform would set the pace for 
economic recovery and would help to soften the pressure from the markets and European 
authorities. This reform was passed in the midst further measures towards privatization and 
deregulation during the last year in office. 
 
However, the monetary turbulences did not stop during the following year. The troika (ECB, 
IMF and European Comission) organised loans to rescue the economy of three countries 
(Ireland, Portugal and Greece twice), imposing strict conditions as an exchange. All these 
events helped to raise the risk premium to unprecedented levels in countries such as Spain 
and Italy. Under strong market pressure, the next reform was launched in August 2011, a few 
months before the elections. It is important to highlight that in the same period the main 
political parties – the PSOE and PP - made a Constitutional reform in order to give priority to 
external debt payments in the national budget and thus appease the international financial 
markets. The measures taken with this last reform abandoned the plan of converting fixed-
term contracts into indefinite ones for a period of two years (until December 2013; this was a 
reform based on a political decision taken some years before). During that time, employers 
were allowed to offer only fixed-term contracts with no further employment commitments. It 
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also made it possible to offer on-the-job training contracts to workers under the age of 30. 
However, the essential points of the reform related to collective bargaining: 
 
1) It gave preference to company agreements over sector agreements; 
 
2) It reduced the possibility of ‘ultra-activity’, introducing the figure of an external 
mediator in order to obtain a final decision. The mediator can re-write the agreement. 
 
3) Opting out by employers of salary schemes agreed at higher levels. 
 
4) More internal labour market flexibility. 
 
This implied a substantial reform in the content of collective bargaining, especially once the 
company agreements become decentralized at the company level. However, the most 
profound reform took place in February 2012 under the PP government. This last reform can 
be considered a landmark in Spanish industrial relations, reshaping the power balance in 
industrial relations. Followed by another strike in March 2012, it has introduced the 
‘flexibilization’ of salaries inside the workplace. It includes possible decreases imposed by 
the employer plus allowing firms to place themselves outside the frameworks of collective 
bargaining agreements and cheapening dismissal costs further. The contents of the reform 
were and are controversial, and represent a significant evolution in Spanish industrial 
relations basd on the explicit goal of adapting Spanish industrial relations to the principles of 
flexicurity. Some points indicated by Meardi (2012) on these developments are the following: 
 
a) Employer unilateral prerogative to introduce ‘internal flexibility’ (changes in job tasks, 
location and timetables), without the need for trade union or works council consent. 
 
b) A new employment contract form, called ‘contrato de apoyo a los emprendedores’, which 
foresees one year probation without employment security. This has been criticized by some 
scholars (Palomeque López, 2013) as a fake indefinite contract. 
 
c) The reduction of compensation for dismissals in some cases (from 45 to 20 days per 
worked year), the removal of the ‘bridge payments’ which the employees dismissed were 
entitled to while waiting for a court ruling, and the removal of administrative permission for 
collective dismissals (the famous EREs). 
 
d) Absolute priority of company-level agreements over multi-employer ones, and employer 
prerogative to reduce wages without union consent, subject to arbitration. 
 
e) Reduction of the time extension (ultra-activity) of collective agreements, until now 
indefinite, to a maximum of two years, after which all established rights from previous 
agreements terminate until a new agreement is signed (in Spain, some agreements have been 
extended for up to ten years). 
 
As a result, in this specific moment company agreements have complete precedence in key 
areas, even if the provincial-level agreement covering their industry is still in force. 
Agreements at the level of organization are able to set terms on basically every issue (wages, 
hours, promotions, work-life balance), irrespective of those already in industry-level 
agreements. In addition, where a company faces particular financial difficulties, it is able to 
suspend many of the agreed terms and conditions. The areas covered by this suspension 
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include essential issues such as working time, pay systems and pay increases, shifts and 
increased functional and geographical mobility. While unions should be consulted on these 
proposals, if they do not agree the issue has to go to arbitration for a decision.  
 
This reform represents a fundamental U-turn in the traditional arrangements of collective 
bargaining in Spain during the democratic period. Trade unions were opposed to the reform, 
considering it a challenge to worker rights and they organized two general strikes in 2012; 
employers found the reform appropriate but felt it fell short of what they wanted  (Lacasa, 
2013). Any systematic and profound tripartite form of social dialogue has not been restored 
to since the Law was passed (Molina and Miguélez, 2013). While institutions like the IMF 
have claimed that an additional reform of the labour market should be undertaken, the 
Spanish government has claimed that the results of the reform have been overtly positive, 
despite the fact that more unemployment has been created.  
 
A Dicussion of the Reforms 
 
The reforms have been the result of a combination of two main political and economic trends, 
one external and one internal to the country, that have finally linked up to transform the 
landscape of Spanish industrial relations. The external one has been the neoliberal policies of 
the EU, and their development of flexicurity principles that form the basis of the doctrine 
from the EU regarding employment policies. This neoliberales drive has been reinforced by 
the dominance of the European Central Bank in European policies, and the leadership of 
Germany’s government in promoting austerity policies. The internal one is represented by the 
employers’ associations and right-wing political demands for higher labour flexibility and 
reductions in labour costs: the two are linked as we discussed above.  
 
Palomeque López (2013) has indicated that the labour market reform of 2012 tries to comply 
with a philosophy of flexicurity, but fails to introduce any kind of security. According to this 
view, the main ideas that are behind this reform are the following: 
 
 
1) It reinforces the power of the individual employer, who is entitled to manage almost 
freely all the working conditions and change the position of the employees in contractual 
terms.  
 
2) It helps to facilitate the modification of working conditions and dismissal by the 
employer, increasing managerial prerogatives. 
 
3) Authorities detach themselves from the workplace, and many bureaucratic procedures and 
authorizations (such as the one for collective dismissals) are eliminated. The role of the 
State decreases notably in employment relations. 
 
4) Dismissal costs are substantially reduced, from a norm of 45 days per year to only 20. 
 
5) There is a generalization of opting out options, which implies that the company level 
agreements prevail over the others. It is interesting to notice how many collective 
agreements have ceased to exist, as we mentioned earlier. The end of ultra-activity helps 
to speed up that process. 
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In economic terms, it is clear that wage settlements have been deeply affected since the 
reform: losses in real wages have already happened and are expected to keep on happening in 
the near future (Molina and Miguélez, 2013). The number of collective agreements has 
decreased notably, as data from August 2014 show. 
 
 
Table 1: Number of signed collective agreements in Spain, 2000-2014. 
 
 
Year Number of 
collective 
agreements 
(total) 
Number of 
covered 
workers 
(total) 
Number of 
collective 
agreements 
(company 
level) 
Number of 
covered 
workers 
(company 
level) 
Number of 
collective 
agreements 
(higher 
levels) 
Number of 
covered 
workers 
(higher 
levels) 
2000 5252 9230400 3849 1083300 1403 8147100 
2001 5421 9496000 4021 1039500 1400 8456500 
2002 5462 9696500 4086 1025900 1376 8670600 
2003 5522 9995000 4147 1074200 1375 8920900 
2004 5474 10193500 4093 1014700 1381 9178900 
2005 5776 10755700 4353 1159700 1423 9596000 
2006 5887 11119300 4459 1224400 1428 9894900 
2007 6016 11606500 4598 1261100 1418 10345400 
2008 5987 11968100 4539 1215300 1448 10752900 
2009 5689 11557800 4323 1114600 1366 10443200 
2010 5067 10794300 3802 923200 1265 9871100 
2011 4585 10662800 3422 929000 1163 9733800 
2012(*) 4006 9899000 2893 826800 1113 9039600 
2013(*) 2408 6956800 1702 460500 706 6496400 
2014(*) 1135 3873800 774 253800 361 3620000 
Source : Collective Agreements’s Statistics, Ministry of Labour, Spain. 
(*) Provisional data. 
 
 
In gender terms, Lousada Arochena (2013) claims that the reforms have been extremely 
negative towards gender equality and work-life balance, once part of the reforms have 
promoted specific types of employment (part-time particularly, but also tele-work) which do 
not guarantee work-life balance - not only because part-time work can substitute what full 
time work - but because there is an expectation that women will end up being offered those 
type of positions. Spanish jobs have traditionally featured very long working hours - a 
heritage of a very masculine and traditional approach to work where taking care of the family 
is reserved to housewives - and the 2012 reforms do not seem to take this into account: as   
internal flexibility might damage the aforementioned work-life balance. Regarding quality of 
work, some scholars (Prieto, 2009) have highlighted the low quality of most of Spanish 
available jobs due to the specific features of the economic structure. The implemented 
reforms do not seem to improve the situation but rather worsen it, once the internal flexibility 
and the opting out policies in collective bargaining have helped to decrease salaries for the 
first time in Spanish history. 
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Some other reforms have been undertaken in many fields linked to employment, with 
hyperactive governments trying to reverse declining economic activity. One of the key 
reforms has been the reform of old age pensions, which raises the compulsory retirement age 
from 65 to 67 years. The plan was heavily criticized as the high rates of temporary 
employment and the frequent unemployment spells of younger workers would make it very 
difficult for them to reach the maximum pension levels (Molina and Miguélez, 2013). There 
have been also constant references at facilitating the conditions for entrepreneurship, a 
stronger focus on activation policies, and other developments.  All these reforms can be 
linked to the principles of ‘flexicurity’, or rather, ‘flexi-insecurity’. 
 
Therefore reforms in the Spanish case can be fully understood as structural reforms of the 
labour market: they represent a new cornerstone in a deregulation in Spanish industrial 
relations. It can be considered to be a paradigmatic than an institutional one, as it represents a 
strong change as we can already observe in the statistics. It is indeed a reform that is more on 
the side of the employers (Valdés dal-Ré, 2012). Lately the government claims the economy 
is improving and praises the labour market reform as key for gaining competitiveness and 
stopping the destruction of employment. However, the reforms’ positive effects on 
employment creation have been so far non-existent.  
 
 
1.4. Overiview of Part 1 
The reforms of labour regulation have taken on a series of directions which one would not at 
first have imagined ten years ago. The extent to which the dismissal of labour has been 
facilitated from the point of view of employers and the extent to which we have seen a major 
restructuring of collective bargaining and a de facto decentralisation has raised many 
concerns.  These reforms have been developed through direct intervention from the majority 
PP government since its election: it has involved very little social dialogue at the national 
level.   The opposition to these reforms have been exhaustive and have been led by both trade 
union and social movements, however the relation between these two consituencies has been 
unclear; and the reforms and the crisis have led to problems and tensions in the relations 
between civil society organisations and labour organisations.  The extent of the reforms have 
brought a new pattern of fragmentation and de-centralisation within industrial relations. 
Running parallel with this has been the ongoing increases in unemployment and reforms of 
the welfare state which have led to rising levels of poverty and social degradation. The 
systems and actors of regulation – especially the trade union movement - have seen capacity 
issues emerge in terms of their ability to sustain the support and management of collective 
bargaining and collective regulation in general.  What we need to know now, in the context of 
these changes, is how have local levels and arenas of bargaining and labour relations more 
generally have been undermined and effected by such changes. Have we seen a genuine 
withering of social dialogue or institutional dialogue in terms of management and labour?  
How have the restrictionn of higher tiers of bargaining and the ability for local levels to 
circumvent the content of such higher tiers influenced the form and content of collective 
bargaining and labour relations at the level of the firm and the workplace? How have specific 
themes of a more social nature changed due to this more fractured approacha nd what effects 
have there been in terms of gender equality for example?    
 
The argument we present is that the narrative and intervention of the Troika cannot be seen 
simply as an external lobby or point of influence that has caused such developments or 
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assisted them directly.  The argument we sustain is threefold. First that during the Socialist 
governments of the past the commitment to social dialogue has not been as extensive as one 
would have first imagined. There has been a flirtation with marketisation in terms of the 
economy whilst attempting to provide a series of minimums in terms of rights and regulations 
at work.  Second, the neo-liberal dimensions of social democracy and the right in particular 
have for some time been nurturing and developing an anti—trade and anti-regulation 
discourse.  This has been driven by a fundamental ideological critique of the rights of 
organised labour which has drawn from current Anglo-Saxon narratives and have had a direct 
input from new North American rightist elements. Thirdly, this means that the policy changes 
in terms of labour relations in the past few years have been accepted and driven from within 
Spain but with legitimacy derived from the European Union both ideolgically and 
technically, irrespective of the crisis. The crisis has accelerated and sustained this shift and 
provided the Spanish right with the means to pursue an agenda which was steadily emerging 
towards the end of its last mandate.  To this extent the reforms are grounded nationally in a 
way that may make their further removal somewhat difficult.                   
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PART 2 RESEARCH FINDINGS  
2.1. Case study selection  
This report will examine the impact of the labour market reforms since 2008 on collective 
bargaining in Spain.  It focused on the results of the study of different case studies at 
company level as well as interviews with national experts and key social partners. As 
mentioned previously, national regulatory frameworks are mediated by institutional 
arrangements and moulded by divergent struggles over particular national practices and we 
will try to observe the way the reforms have been shaped and contextualised.  Hence the 
report will use many of the comments and views of the individuals we interviewed. We aim 
to build an analysis which uses the voices and concerns of the individuals involved in the 
process. The report will be organized as follows: 
 A discussion of the methodology utilised and an outline of the expert interviews we 
did and case studies.  
 A discussion of the basic elements and traditions of collective bargaining in Spain 
 The specific aspects of the reforms  
 A general and tentative conclusion regarding the longer term effects and 
developments emerging from the reform   
Our conclusion tries to outline the main issues and longer term impact of the reforms. Whilst 
we have seen a greater degree of unilateral activity from employers and a reduction in the 
breadth and impact of collective bargaining – much of which is quite extensive – we 
nevertheless do continue to see collective bargaining playing an important role, albeit a 
recued one.  What is more we have seen a series of anomalies and contradictions emerge 
from the reforms as the question and process of joint regulation becomes more politicised and 
fragmented. Finally, the interviews with HRM professionals, trade unionists, employer 
organisations and experts suggest that there is a fear that the value of social dialogue and the 
importance of co-ordination is not being appreciated by those driving or, shall we say, 
enamoured by such reforms.   
 
2.2. Methodology 
As has been mentioned in previous reports, the methodology in this research has been based 
on interviews with different people in the field of Spanish industrial relations. In the case of 
Spain, we have interviewed a number of individuals linked to two main categories that is to 
say experts and actors engaged with collective bargaining processes at a sector or company 
level. All the interviews were carried out by the three members of the Spanish team of 
researchers (the authors) and were recorded on audio and transcribed.  
We have interviewed 24 individuals: although some more may be added. Several experts on 
collective bargaining linked to different political and academic institutions have been 
interviewed. This includes in the first place academics with different views on industrial 
relations such as Professor Santos Ruesga (one of the most respected economists of the 
country, with close links to the trade union UGT) or Associate Professor Marcel Jansen 
(member of FEDEA, a think tank which advocates a certain degree of deregulation in 
employment relations), both working at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. They were 
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invited to the national workshop with some other scholars such as Carlos Prieto and Luis 
Enrique Alonso and provided interesting insights about the topic. From the employers’ side 
Ana Herráez, an employment relations officer from CEOE (the main employers’ association), 
and Fernando Navarro, CEOE’s ex-director of employment relations, were interviewed. The 
main representatives of sector level employers’ associations such as Confemetal (metal), 
Feique (chemistry), Sercobe (capital goods) and Stanpa (perfume and cosmetics) also agreed 
to share their views on the reforms of collective bargaining and their current outcomes. From 
the trade unions’ side, we interviewed important actors from the main trade unions: Toni 
Ferrer, national secretary for the UGT for trade union action; and Marieta Garcia Guttierez 
who works in the area of collective bargaining of the UGT; and Juan Blanco and Daniel 
Laguna, in charge of international relations and working in the Madrid region department for 
organisation respectively at the CCOO. We also interviewed another officer from CCOO in a 
different sector, Daniel Albarracín to compare the trade and commerce situation with the one 
of manufacturing: there were also informal interviews with a range of individuals in both 
trade unions. Alberto Arévalo and Carlos Paraíso spoke on behalf of the Madrid region metal 
and chemical sector of CCOO while J. A. Moreno from the same union spoke about how 
reforms affects immigrants and general issues of equality.  Finally, we have interviewed the 
former Minister of Labour during the period 2010-2011, Mr. Valeriano Gómez. We have also 
managed to conduct several case studies in the manufacturing sector. We experienced 
difficulties when engaging both human resource managers and trade unionists in joint 
interviews, and in many cases only one of the actors accepted to be interviewed. Both social 
partners were interviewed at a main car manufacturer and we also had various informal 
discussions during the visit which involved various trade unionists; in another vehicle 
manufacturer, interviews took place with the HR manager and the CCOO representative. HR 
managers from four large companies linked to the glass, energy and metal sub-sectors were 
interviewed but unfortunately trade unionists in such companies were not successfully 
contacted. The time frame made this slightly challenging.  
  
2.3. The peculiarities of the manufacturing sector in terms of collective bargaining 
Key Features Collective Bargaining in Spain  
As was mentioned before, the Spanish model of industrial relations situates collective 
agreements at the core of its employment relations, and trade unions and employers’ 
associations are key actors in the development of such agreements. Those labour agreements 
cover aspects such as the way wages are fixed, work and employment conditions, and the 
general regulation of collective relationships in different levels (including health and safety at 
the workplace, training, and measures to fight against the segmentation of the labour market).  
 
As stated previously the basic pirnciples of the system are as follows.The legitimacy of the 
"most representative union" to participate, depends on support in the works council and trade 
unions elections and not from the number of affiliated workers. In terms of the principle of 
‘statutory extension’, this establishes that any collective agreement higher than company 
level must be applied to all companies and to all workers forming part of the geographical 
and industry level in question. It is irrelevant if they have participated or not in the bargaining 
process. This sets the limits for further agreements, thus guaranteeing a certain minimums in 
the company level bargaining. Finally, there is the extension of collective agreements: “Ultra-
activity” refers to an agreement remaining valid if it has not been renewed.  
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Negotiations take place usually between trade unions and employers’ associations. However, 
in specific cases they are also sometimes signed by the government in order to provide a 
further point of legitimacy. Different sets of dialogues may occur at four different levels: 
national, regional, brand of industry, and company/organisation level, and as was mentioned 
before that they cover a broad range of issues such as training, job classification, sickness, 
maternity arrangements or health and safety. The results of the specific negotiations had 
effects on all employees in the area that the collective agreement was covering. Therefore, if 
a certain agreement is reached in a specific cluster of the manufacturing sector and in a 
province, then the companies of that sub-sector based in that province would be subjected to 
those agreed labour conditions: although what aspects were adhered to varied in practice. The 
negotiations are driven by employers and works councils but, at the higher levels beyond the 
organization, the agreement could only be signed by representatives of the "most 
representative unions" at national or regional level. The law describes how negotiations are to 
be conducted and what is the composition of both sides. Agreements tend overall to last two 
years or more, and almost invariably started from the beginning of the year (though 
negotiations could begin anytime within that year).  
 
In the specific case of manufacturing in Spain, the specific features of the sector are of 
interest in order to consider how reforms have accepted the development of collective 
agreements. It should be noted that traditionally manufacturing has been at the core of 
Spanish industrial relations with strong and militant unions, well-organized employers’ 
associations and a long history and tradition of industrial conflict. However, the sector itself 
differs greatly from the classic image of big corporations in industry. Actually the 
manufacturing sector, as well as its different sub-sectors are in general highly fragmented in 
terms of companies’ size. Therefore sub-sectors such as metal featured many small firms 
embedded in the local economy plus a few bigger companies, mostly multinational 
subsidiaries. Therefore, there was hardly any national level agreement, with a dominance of 
province-based agreements and some company level agreements in the larger firms. 
According to a representative of the metal employers Confemetal, this was due to the 
peculiarities of the sector, which mirrored in a way the economic structure of the country 
(based on small and medium sized companies): 
 
… the national agreement is posted on the website of ... Confemetal, you can check it, 
you can download it. The second chapter details how the sector is structured and well, 
recognizing the reality of the industry, we find... that provincial agreements 
predomínate. Logically the state level bargaining would then only be limited to those 
issues. Provincial agreements, sector-level agreements and company-level agreements, 
that is what exists. That is precisely the level around which collective bargaining is 
structured in the metal sector. It is a sector -in line with the rest of the Spanish industry 
and the Spanish economic structure- which is dominated not only by SMEs, but 
particularly by micro-companies. 92% (of the Confemetal members) are SMEs which 
are very tiny with less than 10 workers, and who expect a certain protection through 
provincial agreements (Metal employers federation Official) 
 
Despite aiming at a national agreement, provincial level agreements remained the norm. 
Ultra-activity and the automatic extension and continuity of previous collective agreements in 
cases where there were no new discussions or agreement related to their renewal was a 
common feature. Besides, while important agreements might be reachable in the metal, 
chemicals and perfumes, there is, however, criticism of the low number of detailed and good 
agreements at the lower level in the sector.  There appears to be a reliance on the upper levels 
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providing frameworks for lower level agreement which are not then fully ‘customised’ to the 
conditions of the company – although these implementation pacts in some cases can be quite 
thorough and the actual sector agreements as in the case of chemicals quite broad and 
encompassing. 
 
Whilst there is a dominant trade union structure due to the results of the four yearly works 
council elections giving the left CCOO and Socialist UGT a dominant position in works 
councils and bargaining mechanisms at various levels, there are exceptions as in the Basque 
Country where there are also nationalist unions and radical minority unions in various 
sectors.  
 
 
2.4. The impact of the reform on the process of collective bargaining in the 
manufacturing sector: social dialogue, content of collective bargaining 
The purpose and politics of the reforms 
The ongoing reforms by the Spanish state in relation to collective bargaining have led to a 
range of legislative changes and innovations that have aimed to ‘modernise’ collective 
bargaining and link the process and outcomes of bargaining to a greater focus on economic 
competitiveness.  The aim has been to allow companies to reduce the salary costs it carries 
and to ensure a greater degree of flexibility in terms of the deployment of labour with regards 
to contracting, internal organisational deployment and dismissals.  The first report (Fernandez 
et al 2014) outlined the motives of many of these reforms.  Ongoing concerns in neo-liberal 
circles with the cost of labour in Spain and the nature of the Spanish workforce  to the point 
where one could argue it has been mythologised into a vision of an intransigent and inflexible 
workforce. Secondly, the manner in which the post-2008 has given rise to high levels of 
unemployment which the government believes can only be responded to by reducing labour 
costs in terms of wages and in terms of the cost of dismissal, which require legislation on 
reforming collective bargaining (decentralising it) and reducing the costs of dismissals. 
Thirdly, the reforms come in the context of a European Union strategy to reduce the public 
deficit and debt of Spain – in great part caused by the crisis of banking – that has focused on 
the need to reduce labour costs. To this extent there has been an ongoing questioning of the 
nature of social dialogue in democratic Spain.   
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This system has been seen by governmental and specific employer circles to have a series of 
rigidities (couched within a highly ideological view of the Spanish labour market): 
 
- The cost of dismissal has been seen to be higher in terms of the 
compensation for years worked by an employee 
- Collective agreements are seen to be a complex labyrinth of national 
sectoral, provincial sectoral, and company agreements which are not 
always clearly tied together 
- Collective agreements remain in place if there is not subsequent renewal 
(ultra-activity) 
- There are few mechanisms for the deployment and utilisation of 
employees within the firm and various ‘inflexibilities’ in terms of the use of 
working time  
 
Hence the legislation has proceeded since 2011 to focus on the following aspects: 
 
- The decreasing of the cost of dismissal in terms of redundancy payments 
by firms  
- The ability for firms to opt out of agreements and change the content of 
them should they have according to the law an ‘economic, technical, 
organisational or productive’ reason to  
- The ability to set terms of conditions of employment should an agreement 
not be renewed due to ultra-activity 
- The ability for the firm to develop greater mechanisms for a flexible 
workforce   
 
The 2012 reform implied drastic changes in what were considered pillars of the collective 
agreement system in Spain. For instance, it gave absolute priority of company-level 
agreements over multi-employer ones, and employer prerogative to reduce wages without 
union consent, subject to arbitration. Besides, the reform obliged to a reduction of the time 
extension (ultra-activity) of collective agreements, limiting it to a maximum of two years. 
This means that established rights from previous agreements would terminate until a new 
agreement is signed. Furthermore, additional measures were taken, such as allowing 
employers to unilaterally introduce ‘internal flexibility’ (changes in job tasks, location and 
timetables), without the need for trade union or works council consent, or reducing once more 
dismissal costs, being particularly controversial the removal of administrative permission for 
collective dismissals. According to many scholars, currently industrial relations in Spain 
seem to be on the verge of a transition and this is worthwhile to examine these changes while 
these are deployed over different economic sectors. 
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During our research El Mundo (25 July 2014) reported alongside other newspapers the results 
of a research project which attributed the creation of 400,000 new jobs in the private sector 
(not including agriculture) to the labour reforms. The lowering of the costs of dismissals was 
seen as a major factors. However, in addition, employers could also now reduce the salary 
and wage levels if the economic, organisational, productive and technical conditions of the 
firm require it.  Companies can opt out of agreements given the circumstances and where 
there is no agreement national state bodies can ‘arbitrate’.  The attribution of employment 
contribution to collective bargaining reform means that industrial relations de-regulation is a 
major part of the response to the crisis.  Although as we will argue later this begins to bring 
the state even closer to the debate about the economic causes for restructuring.  
In our workshop a person in broad support of the reforms argued: 
In the first place, I think it is key the idea that the crisis highlighted the need for reforms 
regarding the collective bargaining system. This need did not start yesterday, but it is a 
long time problem... The Spanish system is practically the only one, along with the 
Portuguese [...] and the Greek, combining automatic exemption, standing requirements 
-ridiculous compared to other countries- and ultra activity ... This reform is not my 
reform, it would not be my reform, but the decentralization of collective bargaining fits 
my views very well, the limits on ultra-activity too ... I would have gone further, 
because, in my view, the challenge is to create a system where we can talk, properly, of 
collective agreements that are collective contracts. That is, that apply to those 
companies and individuals who have chosen to be part of those contracts, and there 
must be mechanisms to extend them after if they gather a sufficient number of 
companies and workers. I mean ..., national agreements for small companies, company-
level bargaining for the large ones. With high coverage, but this is not yet observed. 
What do you notice instead? .... These agreements work because they are very tough. 
They have […] forced to accept concessions, but they can never be part of the core 
collective bargaining system in Spain. Contracts have to be respected and you cannot 
provide companies what I call "the red button". That is, for years we do not worry, we 
pay salary rises and when there is a difficult situation: "paf" [blow on the table]. I set 
the timer to zero, threatening with dismissal and salary cuts. This is not the way 
forward. But this is the part of the reform that has had more impact. I think that the 
resistance by social partners and their disengagement with the reform have made the 
positive effects we were looking for not to emerge. This is because there is an 
enormous resistance to abandon the fragmentation of collective bargaining in Spain, 
this sector-provincial level which makes no sense… (Economist linked to think tank 
FEDEA) 
In observing the reforms in question we need to appreciate that in some case the reforms had 
a precise effect in actually changing the nature of bargaining and the general impact in terms 
of how expectations and calculations have been modified.  The latter is very important 
because in many cases it has been the threat of the use of the legislation which has impacted 
on the scheme of industrial relations and brought more moderate attitudes or conciliatory 
responses from trade unions.  In one large metal company for example this was seen to be 
important in sending a signal to the workforce. A significant reduction in wages was 
proposed and achieved by the firm, on the basis that most other elements of the employment 
relations in terms and conditions of employment were not substantially reformed.   
The question of opting out: ultra-activity and the by-passing of agreements   
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The need to stop the ultra-activity in Spanish industrial relations system was a requirement of 
the European Commission, particularly since 2010-2011 when the most difficult period of the 
crisis started. Therefore, the last government of PSOE passed a first reform of the collective 
bargaining system. This reform abruptly tried to put an end to ultra-activity by imposing 
arbitration when employers and workers did not reach a new agreement. However, this is 
problematic from the point of view of state action, once it is obvious that any attempt to 
impose agreements on the social partners borders the illegality: in one way or another, this 
decision violates the fundamental rights of a free market economy. In fact, this first reform 
was immediately dennounced as an unconstitutional measure (although there was no time 
even to begin the procedure as the political term was about to end). According to Valeriano 
Gómez, former Minister of Labour and one of the persons behind this frustrated reform, one 
of the main weaknesses of the industrial relations system in Spain has been the inability to 
develop institutions of Mediation and Arbitration. Such institutions should have not only 
legitimacy but real capacity to force agreements on a scale that would be meaningful and 
could set the terms of a balance of power between employers and employees. Therefore, in 
the case of labour relations in Spain, and in the absence of an agreement, the final resolution 
of the conflict usually ends up resorting to the courts and their interpretation of the law, 
instead of using relatively neutral arbitration institutions that would try set contents mutually 
accepted and adapted to the specific circumstances of each conflict. It is, in this sense, that 
we have observed how, from the point of view of the workers, the recent legal reforms have 
been used as a kind of threat in the negotiation process. If negotiations fail and both parties 
go to court, it might be likely that the resolution of conflicts would favorable to the interests 
of the employers, once the latest legal changes have tended to strengthen their position (or 
their representatives’). However, there is an interpretive range inherent to any law, and the 
context is very complex after a succession and accumulation of ever-accelerating reforms. 
The fact is that many effects of the reforms are still ambiguous and it is not easy to assess the 
real impact in the medium term of the decomposition of the foundations of the pre-crisis 
system of collective bargaining.  
Social dialogue continues to exist but increasingly it is coerced or now forced by employers – 
it is less a case of a de-recognition of trade unions and labour relations as in some aspects of 
the United Kingdom as one of forcing through agreements on the employer side using the 
new legislative context.   
The crisis makes negotiations difficult. The year that has had more bargaining coverage 
in Spain has been 2008, indeed, and since then it has gone downhill. It was logical, with 
the labour market development, the coverage was a little lower. However, since the 
reform of 2012 in February -that comes into force in February, even if it does not 
become a law until-, the loss of coverage has been brutal. This is because, among other 
things, the reform of 2012 included the possibility of avoiding "ultra-activity", which in 
reality tries to avoid the generation of loopholes, something key in collective 
bargaining. This has made part of the process more annoying, because when there was 
an expectation that collective agreements might cease to have an effect, then collective 
bargaining slowed down notably. (UGT trade union economist) 
Due to restrictions on ultra-activity we are seeing large parts of the workforce not covered by 
the remit of collective bargaining due to delays in their collective bargaining:  
There is yet to be negotiated the collective bargaining of 37, 93% of workers, that is, 
for the 38%. (UGT trade union Economist). 
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Ultra-activity in the form of the automatic renewal of collective agreements and the 
automatic linking of pay increases to the inflation rate is therefore challenged by the 
legislation, as employers can opt out and unilaterally set the conditions of work given certain 
organisational and economic circumstances. We are seeing, as noted above, that many 
companies are left without agreements or suspended arrangements. However there are cases 
where agreements remain valid due to specific clauses that indicate that the agreement is 
valid until one partner steps out. So there has to be a deliberate act by employers to avoid the 
agreement and it is yet to be seen in the longer term how many firms will continue to do this.  
As stated earlier in one of our cases – large scale metal firm - there was a positive dialogue of 
reform but how this was achieved is in part on the back of a legal threat by the employer to 
invoke the reforms. Hence the legislation allows for a certain type of game-playing and 
‘chicken’-like collective action scenarios, as per game theory.  Much depends on whether the 
firm sees the role of social dialogue as being of value across a range of issues and strategic 
dialogues: and of the political sensitivity to any changes within the regions the firm is located 
in as in the Basque country. It appears to be more a case of the threat of the use of the 
legislation to gain significant changes especially in terms of salaries and wages, and their 
decrease: there is a ‘recalibrating’ of the industrial relations through the use of and reference 
to the reforms. 
We have seen the reforms used as a body of potential coercive resources to force social 
partners especially trade unions into more ‘realistic positions’, however the longer term is 
more complex and these strategies bring serious social and economic consequences. The 
ultra-activity related reforms are leading those companies who engage with it and unions that 
have to respond and accept such changes to revise their agreements and there is evidence this 
is mainly being rushed and not being used to deepen any dialogue across more strategic 
issues: there is in effect no expansion of the remit of collective bargaining and its strategic 
value. The main question for the future is whether such reforms actually deliver a more 
economically sensitive dialogue or a more truncated minimalist one within the sphere of the 
firm.   
However in the metal sector the changes in terms of working hours and other conditions as a 
consequence of the ‘descuelge’ from the collective agreement is becoming clear: 
Many, many companies stepped down, and this also has positive aspects. It is likely 
that despite such a tremendous unemployment rate we have here maybe it would have 
been higher without that wage lift, because that is a measure of flexibility for 
companies to survive, right? Most implementation agreements have been agreed, with 
rates of ninety percent and more, but the crisis, in the end... is still tremendous in the 
sector, lots of companies are disappearing. Another problem we have is that the weight 
of the industrial sector in relation to GDP is becoming smaller… Employment and 
social security data are very good but of course there is very precarious employment, 
temporary employment and what they bring to the social security system these nearly 
200,000 workers is very little, most of them are working part-time. That is better than 
nothing but they provide very little to the system. When the season ends these 
gentlemen again hit the road, , eh ... you're also seeing, for example something unusual, 
that I had never seen, I have been many years here, eh... I mean increases in working 
hours, the tendency was always a combination of increments and cuts, well, we have 
seen agreements that have increased the working time, as an example in Burgos the 
working time per year has increased no less than 16 hours, in Cádiz I don’t not know if 
there were 12, in Cantabria 3 or 4, something that did not occur before (Metal 
Employers Organisation). 
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The reform of the ultra-activity has been considered a key issue in the reforms. According to 
the representative of CEOE, it had been a long-term goal for the employers. According to her 
view, trade unions always departed from a position in which the only option was to imporve 
over previously agreed conditions. Therefore, the reform would help to balance employment 
relations, putting both sides at a same and fairer level: 
For example regarding the issue of ultra-activity, what we see is that it has been re-
balanced, before was no real balance whatsoever because well, you knew that when you 
would negotiate on the basis of what you had in the previous agreement. Therefore 
unions always started from a bottom line in the negotiation which was the earlier 
agreement, and simply demanded more wages, more free time, more holidays, more 
paid leave, and so on. Hence there was not an equilibrium in the bargaining. What we 
understand then is that reform issues such as the ultra-activity have contributed to re-
balance the imbalance that existed before. However, and logically, different social 
partners have completely different positions about this (CEOE national employer body 
official) 
For trade unions, the reform implied a new opting-out strategy for firms.  However, in 
practice and in order not to disrupt too seriously industrial relations, employers made 
agreements with unions to preserve the contents of the agreements for several years as one 
employers representative made clear: 
Trade unions and employers are equally fearful of ultra-activity. That is, there are times 
in which entrepreneurs themselves are the ones who want to keep their ultra-activity 
agreement. What does this mean? This is not a statistic, let’s say, rigorous, but of the 
new collective agreements that were signed after the reform and, theoretically, could be 
of limited duration in time, I presume that between 40 and 50% are agreeing unlimited 
ultra-activity. You can see many reasons for the agreement between the two parts: the 
union might say, "Hey, or either we agree a limited ultra-activity or we do not accept 
moderation in the wages increases", or whatever. The truth is the fact that the statistics 
point at 40-50% of agreements including ultra-activity. Let’s say that there is a 20% of 
the total of the agreements that have been adjusted to the legal terms of the average 
maximum ultra-activity: one year, a year and a half. The rest, meanwhile, which can be 
around 30-35%, have been looking for limited but much longer periods of ultra-
activity. That is, if the collective agreement would end, there may be at least two or 
three years of ultra-activity '(exCEOE national employer body official) 
However, it seems indisputable that the reforms of recent years have opened up a space to 
weaken the regulatory power of collective bargaining, expanding the grounds and facilitating 
the process by which companies can "opt out" of the guidelines set in collective agreements 
(mainly on issues relating to workday, shifts and time distribution of work, payment 
mechanisms, and performance work systems). Still there has been too little time to assess 
what will be the impact and the specific uses of these new “opting out” options for 
businesses. However, in the parliamentary session on September 17, 2014, the current 
Minister for Employment, Fatima Bañez, claimed that "since the entry into force of the 
labour market reform in 2012 there have been 4,900 derogations from collective agreements, 
99% with agreement between the parties, which has saved more than 300,000 jobs. 
1
" 
                                                          
1
 http://www.europapress.es/economia/laboral-00346/noticia-economia-laboral-banez-asegura-inaplicaciones-
convenios-salvado-300000-empleos-reforma-laboral-20140917104940.html  
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Table 1: Opting out data: agreements, companies, workers and company size (1) 
Company size 
Opting out from 
agreements (cases) 
  
Companies 
  
Workers 
  2013 2014 (*)  2013 2014 (*)  2013 2014 (*) 
TOTAL 2.512 1.627 2.179 1.474 159.550 53.137 
      1-49 workers 1.965 1.342 1.770 1.241 21.328 14.281 
      50-249 workers 313 203 259 168 25.699 13.593 
      250 or more workers 189 55 108 39 109.312 24.800 
      Unavailable 45 27 42 26 3.211 463 
Source : Collective Agreements’s Statistics, Ministry of Labour, Spain. 
(*) Provisional data, last update in August. 
 
The Ministry of Employment has generated this new statistical series collected in Table 1 and 
whose evolution will be further analyzed in the future to assess the impact of "opting out". 
While the total number of workers affected since January 2013 is still moderate (212,687), it 
is indicative of how businesses of medium or large (over 250 employees) have begun to use 
this route to mainly avoid wage increases agreed in collective agreements at a provincial or 
state level. And it is particularly significant that over 90% of these opting out strategies have 
been agreed with representatives of workers, in many cases as an emergency prerequisite 
before signing new conditions in a separate company-level agreement. It is in many ways a 
situation that strengthens the corporate position: the end of the ultra-activity agreements, 
together with the possibility of opting out from their content, facilitates agreements with 
union representatives but always within different dynamic pervaded by a certain decline in 
conditions. The recent use of external companies (experts in the field of labour law) to handle 
the negotiation process is due, at least in part, to this vast array of choices. The cost of using 
external consulting firms is increasingly offset by the increasing ability to negotiate the terms 
bargaining down, helped by a network of increasingly complex labor laws. 
We now turn attention to a general description of the kinds of issues that are being affected 
by these changes in the following section.  
 
The question of content and agreements 
In terms of the content of agreements as a consequence of the reforms in general terms we 
have seen a focus on wages and working hours emerge which ironically reinforces the 
narrowness of bargaining. In the interviews it is mentioned occasionally that only working 
hours and wages are discussed, in a very conservative scenario reinforced by the crisis.  
Opting-out of agreements, according to trade unions, leads to immediate wage reductions. In 
economic terms, it is clear that wage settlements have been deeply affected since the reform: 
losses in real wages have already happened and are expected to keep on happening in the near 
future (Molina and Miguélez, 2013). The number of collective agreements has decreased 
notably, as data from February 2014 show in Table 1 above. There is increasingly a new 
distribution of working time, a growing abuse in terms of extra working hours, and 
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challenges to maternity leave due to the culture being created by the climate of the reforms 
according to one of our interviewees from the trade union CCOO
2
. 
 
The changing role of the state  
The irony of the reforms is that where there is a challenge and where unilateral action needs 
to be taken it bring forth and increasing role for the state in judicial terms.  In theory the state 
has to provide the green light to the unilateral actions of employers if systematically 
challenged on a range of issues and this requires detailed scrutinising of individual cases and 
more recently as with Coca Cola and its redundancy programmes which were not accepted by 
the courts due to the lack of information provided to the works councils. In the case of FNAC 
the French retail firm the economic argument was seen as being providing spurious 
arguments for restructuring. Hence, the reforms have the potential of politicising 
restructuring and creating a more political climate within the debates on the terms and 
conditions of employment.   
Besides it is not possible to step out from the agreements, you always need an 
agreement with the workers' representatives. That is, a company cannot opt out because 
it is needed that workers’ representatives sign the agreement unless there are real causes 
of economic crisis in the company. The real issue of this reform is that it is compulsory 
to reach an agreement to opt out. Therefore, opting out is only working in those 
companies that are doing really badly, that is, mortally wounded firms. In these 
companies, there is no problem, workers understand what is going on and sign, because 
they know that either they sign the conditions of the opting out or the company simply 
goes bankrupt tomorrow. However, those other companies where causes are not as real, 
or simply decide something like "look, let’s take the opportunity to save some money 
here," well they cannot opt out because they are unable to settle a deal with the workers' 
representatives. And that's for me a problem that the reform leaves unresolved: what 
happens when there is no agreement in the opting out and in the derogations. (Labour 
Relations Coordinator, FEIQUE - Chemical Employers Organisation). 
The problem however rests in the fact state agencies are not consistently stepping in to 
resolve things as planned and not quite intervening to set the rates of pay and terms of 
conditions where there is no agreement or where there is a lack of clarity on the causes.  The 
courts and judicial processes are very slow in dealing with cases and appeals and this is 
creating a further regulatory vacuum where employers can act unilaterally where they feel 
that they can. This dysfunctional feature of the Spanish labour courts has been a challenging 
aspect of labour relations in Spain for some time especially in dealing with health and safety 
cases (see Martinez Lucio, 1998 for a broad discussion).  It plays the role of being a form of 
facilitator of de-regulation by default as it cannot – even when willing – cover the increasing 
range of cases that are emerging. 
In this sense, one of the procedures that deserves more attention is, without any doubt, the 
ones related to mediation and refeering, which many of the intervieewes consider 
underdeveloped and in need of reforms. Currently, when discrepancies arise regarding 
collective agreements, there is an advisory committee in charge of finding solutions to solve 
the conflicts. It is a foundation with representatives from both trade unions and business 
orgnizations (CEOE, CEPYME, UGT and CCOO) whose name is Servicio Interconfederal de 
Mediación y Arbitraje (Fundación SIMA). If discrepancies are not resolved within the 
                                                          
2
 It is difficult to find data regarding these issues. However, websites such as http://www.abusospatronales.es/ 
provide examples of different ways of exploitation in firms and businesses operating in Spain. 
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advisory committee they might be diverted to external arbitration. In this case, an arbitrator 
might be proposed by the committe, usually an expert with experience in the public 
administration or academia. However, while the advisory committee has mediated in 
thousands of cases successfully, some of the experts interviewed have claimed that there is 
room to improve the figure of the external arbitrator. As one expert from the national 
employer body mentions: 
The system, right now, has been focused on mediation, and has not made the leap 
forward to arbitration. Why? Because there is still mistrust. […] each party uase their 
own mediator. There is a distrust in the referee as she could not be a neutral figure. […] 
In the best case, there is usually one mediator, but in most of the cases you find two 
mediators who talk among themselves. And mediators, with all due respect, are not 
professionals. “They call me from time to time [...]: "hey, look, we have a conflict 
here," because someone once put me on a list. "A conflict here at Coca Cola, if you 
want to come." And I say, "I have no f***ng idea what is Coca Cola about. How am I 
to mediate the issue of Coca Cola. I do not know, I'm an amateur, albeit professional, 
etc. Therefore I think we should go towards a system of professional arbitration. 
Professionals who live from arbitration. This is happening in America, experts charge 
lots of money for this service because they are professionals, they are guys that play the 
role of judges. [...]. And secondly, there is another view: someone from the Ministry of 
Labour, from the world of labour inspection, had an interesting project, which is what 
we might call "preventive mediation". That is, find good people, almost always from 
outside the company, that before any outbreak of conflict commit themselves to find 
solutions to avoid the extension of the conflict within the company or industry [...]. And 
then there is a third element, a third possible body, which it should be investigated, I 
have some references: systems of internal mediation and arbitration at the company 
level. When we negotiated three years ago the collective agreement for the Spanish 
Public Television, we implemented a system of internal arbitration. Television unions 
and the management body appointed a mediator-arbitrator, who knows well the 
company from inside and takes care of the arbitration, right? Internal systems are 
possible in large corporations, but are not in SME. We must use external systems. But 
thinking with those three possibilities I think you could go a little bit more in improving 
the systems, right?. (ex CEOE national employer body) 
Furthermore, there appear to be legal anomalies especially in relation to the general rights of 
trade unions as the reforms are clearly undermining constitutionally based rights regarding 
voice and representation.  
In particular, during the last two years 81 lawsuits have been opened against more than 300 
strikers, of which over 260 are union representatives (several with regional management 
positions within the unions). These lawsuits are implementing a section of the Penal Code 
adopted in 1995 but never used before, and allows request from six months to three years in 
prison to "coerce others to start or continue a strike," ie, those involved in the so-called 
"informational picketing". In June 2014 two trade unionists have been sentenced to three 
years and one day in prison because they were participating in a picket during the general 
strike of March 29, 2012. They were accused, paradoxically, of crimes against the rights of 
workers. The exceptionality of these lawsuits is that they have been initiated at the request of 
public authorities and not by individual complaints (albeit a few exceptions). That is to say, 
these lawsuits seem to have become an element of intimidation to stop any attempt of 
resistance and opposition to recent reforms. During our fieldwork, we found a case where the 
managerial board of the company seems to have taken advantage of this new attitude in the 
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public administration as a way to intimidate union representatives (in a factory with a heavily 
unionized workforce and a long tradition of industrial conflict). In this case, the trial itself has 
been open because of the particular complaint of one manager of the Company. This manager 
alleged being physically coerced by some of the Company workers when trying to enter his 
office. This happened in one of the strikes that took place while negotiating the Company-
level agreement in 2012. From the point of view of one of the workers concerned, this 
conflict is seen as another episode related to the new options open by the law, put into force 
by the management in order to balance power relations on the shopfloor: 
Well, the attacks are impersonal but, quoting The Godfather, it is just "pure business." 
What is collapsing is the rules. They try to break those rules […], as they have 
managed to break the rules that gave power to unions and workers to negotiate and to 
reach agreements which were ironclad. Above all, the loss of ultra-activity 
conventions is a weapon that destroys workers and unions, and takes our rights away 
in the most brutal way. It is already getting away with our salaries. […] Logically […] 
that ends up being materialized in the corporations. In a firm with a certain industrial 
conflicto tradition, whose unions have power and keeps strong conventions, well 
maybe... it costs several attempts to get ir. So the first assault... the first two rounds we 
were more powerful because it did not succeed. We are determined to make the 
second attempt to fail, but we know that we are, somehow, an island. And because we 
are an island... we are threatened to be invaded by a tsunami of labor reform... (Trade 
Union representative MNC metal firm) 
 
The prevailing perception among the union representatives who were interviewed (both at the 
grassroots and in positions of responsibility in their organizations) is that legal changes are 
strengthening the bargaining position of employers and employers’ representatives. If 
traditionally entrepreneurs avoided recourse to the labour courts (since it was considered that 
they favoured the protection of workers' rights), recent changes invite us to consider that 
workers might prefer a bad agreement before going to court (because with the recent legal 
reforms, judgments tend to favour and protect the interests of the companies). 
What we are seeing is a new complexity which brings forth its own bureaucratic dilemmas. 
The legislation appears to facilitate a greater degree of employer prerogative on the one hand 
but it also leads to a greater degree of uncertainty in terms of industrial relations processes 
and conflict.  The final part of the report will develop these general anomalies and ironic 
outcomes in relation to the reform of collective bargaining.   
 
A fragmented landscape: the sphere of small and medium sized employers. 
One of the main concerns relates to smaller firms who depend in terms of their industrial 
relations processes on higher levels of agreements and basic local company agreements that 
are framed within them. There is the fear amongst trade unionists that such firms begin to 
leave the orbit of regulated social dialogue and collective bargaining. In our national 
workshop, the following discussion developed:  
'The crisis itself and the structure of micro-firms make it possible to produce and let 
such abuses happen, especially right now with the issue of time  
De facto opting out occurs.  
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Because they are widespread in these areas. I think the crisis is having an enormous 
influence on, labor relations at this time. And regardless of what policy says, and we'll 
see...  
The crisis accentuated something that already existed.  
But, for example, in the Basque Country, which is where the phenomenon of company-
level agreement is taking over... Why? Because the unions that dominate are nationalist 
unions which have bet, bet on union business. And as CEOE and UGT, unfortunately, 
do not have the weight they have in other parts of Spain, basque unions are promoting 
this. They are using it to change the industrial relations changing the negotiation 
towards company-level... That's the trend. And it takes place largely in the Basque 
Country. ' 
Trade unions involved in small and medium sized firms and the negotiation of provincial 
agreements have noted firms beginning to test the resolve and actual capacity of a union and 
its local representatives to counter any attempt of the firm opting out or downgrading 
negotiated conditions of work. Unions see a significant change in attitude but there are some 
sectors where the dialogue and informal relations are strong  
New types of legal agencies have emerged and are establishing a network whereby 
companies can ‘descolgar’ from agreements – there is evidence of agreements having to be 
signed even with deteriorating wages so as to hang onto some semblance of collective 
agreement. Smaller firms are turning to legal firms and consultancies to steer through 
changes to agreements and to undermine provincial agreements.  There are new agreements 
being used as a template for signing reductions in pay and increases in working hours and the 
use of new forms of labour deployment.  These being circulated and used as a way to rethink 
the process of social dialogue. These law firms and consultancies are a developing industry 
which are concerned with the very form of negotiation let alone its content: 
Such law firms are a staple of Spanish labour relations but there is a noticeable increase in 
those with a more hostile view of trade unions. There are events and lunches held by such 
firms to attract businesses to do business with them and these new types of consultancies are 
reflecting some of the developments that have been observed in the anti-union lobbies of the 
USA and the UK. They are in some cases linked to right wing organisations and build on the 
hostile climate towards trade unions in Spain (see Fernandez Rodriguez and Martinez Lucio, 
2013 & 2014).  
This new panorama of employers seeking to opt out or limit the regulatory processes of 
collective bargaining - especially in smaller firms – will have a negative impact on the overall 
terms and conditions of employment of workers due to the nature of industrial relations in 
those sectors.  Trade unions have relied heavily on the role of national sector and provincial 
sector agreements as frameworks for such employers and groups of workers in the past. In 
this respect the strategy from a union perspective consisted of using such frameworks to 
underpin at least the basic terms and conditions of work, building a platform for local 
agreements to enshrine and if possible add to these agreements, and to have campaigns in 
relation to work council and trade union representative elections which allow for local 
networks and representatives to share the terms and conditions of agreements and related 
issues.  The trade union at the regional and provincial level were able to use the four yearly 
trade union and works council elections to raise their representation with such workplaces 
which are normally harder to reach due to their size and location, but entering such 
workplaces ‘armed’ with the relevant provincial collective agreement provided a point of 
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legitimacy for the union as terms and conditions could be explained and compared to those 
on anyone site.  The problem is that as companies opt out or bypass such agreements their 
legitimacy become less significant especially as their terms and conditions of work are 
reduced.    
However the union strategies used to reach smaller firms especially during such works 
council workplace representative elections has been an ongoing challenge for unions even if 
they have specialised units for this within the Organisation division of the trade unions. There 
is evidence that there is greater difficulty in reaching and communicating to such firms and 
that the climate is more hostile to trade unions accessing the workplace as employers begin to 
opt out in operational and even ideological terms from the processes of social dialogue. The 
reforms are testing the ability of the unions at the level of small and medium sized firms and 
at the provincial level in managing and controlling working conditions.  The pressure on 
union resources and in supporting such local strategies of support and networking means that 
there is difficulty in surveying local territories and its smaller employers.  This is not 
necessarily a direct result of the reforms in collective bargaining but as firms begin to ‘opt 
out’ then the local agreements relevant to them are a less effective tool for such campaigns.   
 
2.5. The general impact of the reform 
The reforms do not have a unanimous level of support amongst employers.  The idea that this 
new neo-liberal or Troika driven turn in the regulation of the conduct of labour relations is 
something that pits capital against labour fails to pick up the value joint regulation has in 
terms of establishing the terms and conditions of employment as well as social peace within 
the workplace and the labour market.  The sectors we have researched reveal very long 
traditions of dialogue around a range of organisational change and restructuring issues.  In the 
case of one metal manufacturing of a large scale and of national importance the HR manager 
argued that it was easy to forget the very detailed discussions and difficult choices taken with 
unions in previous years which had been pivotal to the peaceful restructuring of the firm.  
That the costs in terms of redundancies may have been higher than some European countries 
does not negate the extent of workers that had been made redundant and the extent of change.  
This had required a major effort from the majority unions in the face of more critical minority 
unions and internal factions. The HR manager went on to argue that this process and 
experience was central to the ‘reconversion industrial’ of the 1980s.  The lead industrial 
relations expert for the chemicals association echoed this view that there had been much 
progress in creating national and local frameworks for discussion which had to be 
appreciated:  
 …although the issue of ultractividad was mainly defended by CEOE, that is by 
businessmen who wanted to promote a more flexible collective bargaining and well, it 
was necessary that agreements would lose their validity, for us, the chemical sector this 
was not so important because we were not afraid to continue with an agreement. We 
have a thirty years experience of negotiations, negotiations have always developed and 
new texts have come to an agreement. We are not at that point. We are not scared. And 
indeed, many entrepreneurs from our sector, they feared otherwise. They said, "Well, if 
it loses its effect now and ends, we lose everything we have achieved during this thirty 
years: many mechanisms that are very helpful for us, such as flexibility, for example. 
We do not want to lose everything that we have negotiated over the years.  (FEIQUE 
official)  
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The representative of Confemetal described the reform of ultra-activity as another tool for 
putting pressure in negotiations rather than something really useful for employers: 
... Both last year and this one there has been a return to the traditional formulas: while 
an agreement has not been reached, the previous one remains in full effect, partly 
because collective agreements clearly do cost money […]... many materials are 
included in the agreement over the years and then, starting again from scratch... and 
then the fear of losing the agreement involves the fear of deconstructing the 
organization: if I lose the agreement what kind of service do I provide to companies 
because everything revolves around that, in the union side this is just the same. Nobody 
is interested in the decline of the agreement. Another issue is that, from a business point 
of view, the disappearance of the ultra-activity is being used to obtain other benefits, it 
is used as a bargaining strategy […] I'm telling you that it is only in Guipúzcoa where 
the agreement has ceased, the rest is exactly as it used to be. (Metal Employers oficial) 
The issue may be understood differently in other sectors but in terms of these key sectors as 
metal and chemicals there did exist view that social dialogue was an essential part of the 
management process even if some changes were acknowledged as being important. There 
was also a view that the reforms were focused on allowing export oriented larger companies 
to constrain their labour costs in quantitative and qualitative terms such that this has created a 
form of reverse social dumping as their circumstances and the obsession with the nature of 
their collective agreements triggers an unsettling of the whole system of social dialogue. 
Even among employers there was a concern on the issue of dumping, seen as able to 
destabilize the framework of industrial relations that had brought a certain degree of 
industrial peace in the last decades: 
The crisis coincides with the reforms of 2011 and 2012 and a major attack on the 
provincial agreements, accusing them of being backward and preventing flexibility in 
business. Then well, the reform tries to break then down and create what Article 84 of 
the statute specifies: matters of applicative priority for Company-level agreements, 
different opting out strategies[…] this creates, generates huge expectations, well, I 
could already opto out of provincial agreements and apply minimum wage and trickle 
down conditions, absurd things that happily have not taken place, because they have no 
rhyme or reason: Moreover a big issue was emerging, in the end a new tremendous 
unfair competition between companies in the sector was rising. This might happen 
more often in the future and probably the companies themselves will undertake a 
turnaround and change the situation a bit. The legal attack on provincial agreements has 
been therefore not leading anywhere, because these agreements play a role, a very 
important role because they you can’t manage a SME unless you have such agreement 
(Confemetal) 
Meanwhile the reform on ultra activity has not been pushed enough by the social partners. 
According to the CEOE representative, many collective agreements are signing those pacts 
again: 
 
Nowadays we are very surprised to realise that in our last reports in collaboration with 
the National Advisory Committee on Bargaining, one key issue is that the agreements 
keep oin going for years. Despite the fact that the labour market reform had raised the 
cessation of ultra-activity after one year... unless otherwise agreed, well we are noticing 
that a large majority of the agreements are either extending the period of one year or are 
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even stating that the agreement shall remain in effect until a new one is negotiated. 
Thereby our efforts... The cessation of ultra activity is therefore being used as a tool for 
revitalization of collective bargaining: negotiators are using collective autonomy to, in 
some way, bet on a security over renewal. It is also true that the issue of ultra-activity is 
still raising many questions: what happens at the higher level agreement, what happens 
with this regulatory vacuum, what it is applied in the case of agreements prior to the 
reform that had clauses which determined that the agreement was maintained until the 
new ... until they negotiate once again. Are these clauses are still valid or not? I think 
that this accumulation of doubts, the fact that there were many social actors in favor of 
keeping the working conditions of the agreement, and that there could be a way to wane 
judicial pronouncements, is making negotiators bet on maintaining ultra-activity, 
which, well, somehow is not making that strategy we had in mind work (CEOE 
Official) 
Meanwhile, leading figures in the UGT claimed that the internal deregulation pursued by the 
government would favour mainly the interests of the biggest export firms of the country:  
The political right and large Spanish companies agree that the solution to the crisis in 
Spain will be one thing: […] a focus on exports. And for that, the competitive factor 
was maintaining the advantage of low labour costs. From here you can guess the role 
they want to give collective bargaining. (UGT National Leader) 
Divisions amongst employer classes and the perceived importance of social dialogue is 
something that was apparent throughout the discussions held in our national workshop and in 
many interviews. Tensions between metal and chemical manufacturers trying to sustain 
dialogue ran up against the almost evangelical and anti-institutionalist neo-liberal 
organisations sustain in the debate. New neo-liberal agencies seem out of sync with 
developments in the purpose and nature of Spanish labour relations, and quite totalitarian and 
obsessive in their reformist zeal. The more critical positions seemed to have a simplistic and 
naïve view that industrial relations could be reformed by the state quite easily through 
legislation and had no real understanding of the way industrial relations systems emerge and 
how they are constructed in real time and historically.   
Furthermore these reforms were not occurring in a high trust environment in many cases as 
the challenge to trade union rights and resources has intensified. The use of ‘forgotten’ 
legislation which makes it difficult to picket and demonstrate coupled with the systematic 
undermining of trade unions in symbolic terms through the press has further undermined the 
way the reforms are understood and used.  The case of one of our metal cases referenced 
earlier suggested that the legal dimension in relation to demonstrations and so forth is in 
some cases being used apart from the collective bargaining reforms to ‘contain’ some aspects 
of the unions.  The reforms in collective bargaining cannot there be seen as some specific 
technical modernisation processes but are linked in various forms to a climate of hostility 
towards social dialogue. The extent to which this creates a less positive predisposition 
towards collective bargaining within unions does not seem to be the issue but it does create a 
climate of distrust and uncertainty of which the longer term consequences are unclear.    
However, various HR and labour relations managers were becoming aware of a growing 
pressure on the majority unions with regards to their ability or willingness to negotiate 
agreements that had significant changes to working conditions included.  In the case of one 
petrochemical multinational there were signs that more radical and militant minority unions 
were pressuring and winning ground in relation to the majority unions.  There were signs that 
one of the majority unions in that case was breaking from its more traditional commitment to 
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emphasising dialogue over conflict.  The fragmentation of the works councils of such firms 
and any fissure between the majority unions would make agreements in the future much more 
difficult. The majority unions were seen as being responsible or passive in the face of the 
reforms and the new agreements that emerged which could be reflected in future works 
council elections.  The questions will be how these developments impact on the extent of 
collective and individual conflict.   
In another metal manufacturing multinational which had actually decided not to engage fully 
with the reforms in collective bargaining in order to sustain the commitment to social 
dialogue central to its corporate identity, the organisation was seeing health and safety and 
workplace stress issues emerge as a new area of concern for trade unionists especially more 
radical minority unions.  The fear expressed even in such cases where the reforms were not 
being fully engaged with and traditional forms of bargaining sustained was that the growing 
strain on the workforce of greater working hours or more ‘flexible’ forms of deployment in 
the organisation would lead to a greater emphasis and conflict around social and health 
related issues at work – and a generic fragmentation of the focus of collective bargaining and 
labour relations generally. Whilst the general mobilisations against the reforms and related 
public policy in the form of 24 hour strikes have been less apparent in the past year there is a 
realisation that the challenge will be less one of an overt political challenge to management 
and more of a growing fracturing in social dialogue.  
In the case of the national chemical sector agreement many firms build their local and firm 
specific negotiations on the back of this highly respected agreement through implementation 
pacts. These allowed firms to remove or underplay contentious and possibly conflict 
generating agendas from their local bargaining and to focus on specific local issues.  This was 
very important to those firms in regions with a more radical or unstable labour relations 
panorama.  The question here was that any decentralisation of bargaining and any systematic 
move to the realm of the firm as the basis of the regulation of employment could create a 
more politicised approach, according to the employers in such sectors, in relation to such 
issues as pay and working hours. The previous and current system had to some extent 
managed to contain dialogue and structure it in ways that avoided conflict and a politicisation 
of workplace issues.    
Various HR managers interviewed pointed to the need to recognise the contribution of 
organised labour to Spanish economic and social development, and expressed concerns with 
the public discourse of the right. The role of positive informal relations and good peak level 
tripartite relations is considered important in sustaining continuity and this is more apparent 
in larger firms. The fear was this tradition could be lost in key sectors.  A leading HR 
manager from a steel MNC argued that the failure to recall the sacrifices of trade unions in 
assiting in the restructuring of the sector since the early 1980s meant that social dialogue 
could be undermined even if one thought that some re-balancing of collective bargaining 
relations was essential.  
The consequences of hurried and fractured collective bargaining processes may even have 
wider implications. The impact on equality and its regulation within the firm may be serious 
as the crisis and shortage of resources within social partners especially unions mean that there 
is less money for training on equality.  Experts in the unions dealing with equality related 
issues have argued that the pressure on the unions may lead to an emphasis on defending core 
conditions and being unable to be proactive as they have been through then monitoring of 
equality plans.  In terms of the firm the Spanish legislation on equality in recent years expects 
them to develop equality plans through their bargaining and social dialogue mechanisms.  
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What is unclear, but what has been referenced in our interviews, is that collective bargaining 
is being suspended in some cases or truncated in terms of the content.  The fact that the 
interests of the Spanish economy and the firm are visualised in terms regulatory opt-outs, 
quick changes in terms of working conditions to allow greater management prerogative in the 
deployment of labour, and short cuts in setting wage levels means that a deeper culture of 
dialogue especially in larger firms on questions of equality and disadvantaged groups may be 
effected especially as in Spain these are in comparative terms at an embryonic stage.  As 
funds for training and social dialogue are reduced by the state – and training for bargaining 
purposes are also reduced – this is an area which may be significantly influenced in the 
coming years. The project of the 90s and 00s within labour relations - especially for the trade 
unions - was based on expanding the thematic remit and agendas of collective bargaining and 
of entering into new themes and deepening such issues as say health and safety.  The current 
context has seen a suspension by default of this project due to the pressures in dealing with 
keeping up with the task of sustaining collective bargaining and of salvaging agreements in 
smaller firms and for those trade unionists supporting such smaller firms: 
 
Yet there are continuities as larger companies and established sectors are not necessarily 
using the legislation and are in fact working as if nothing has changed in some cases but this 
may be due to cases where there is a strong level of European or global wide corporate 
integration: 
The labour market reform, well watch out, very few companies have implemented it, 
eh. Yes they are taking to lower wages and layoffs, in some cases seized, let's say, 
supported by the labor reform, by which they lose money or lose or whatever. Yes, 
there are new elements to reduce staff, wages. But the overall statewide implementation 
in companies is not very deep. This is because the labour market reform is against 
common sense, I think, of what the people in the company level do and at the level of 
workers... In the end leaves the worker with no resilience. That is, the idea would be an 
individual agreement worker-company. In some cases there are workers who believe 
they can negotiate individually. But we as trade unionists, I can proudly say, where 
more union presence there is, normally better wages exist and, let's say, better work. 
Work has a more sociable side. Normally this is how it is. (Trade Union Representative, 
Large Car Manufacturer) 
According to the labour relations manager of the same company he shares such a view 
although the question of change remains important. 
It's very complicated. And to put into the hands of the company, everything we have 
historically achieved since immemorial times through industrial conflict… well I think 
that is something that represents an attack on unions and non-unionized workers, 
actually all workers and citizens. We cannot be fooled. We believe, eh. We, the unions 
believe that this society has been cheated. In these last elections they have received a 
shock. I'm happy with the fright they have experienced. Hopefully it will higher next 
time. Yes, because you have to get it over with bipartisanship, the latter is the only 
thing that is leading us to mistake after mistake, after mistake and terrible erros for us. 
We believe that other younger options, other generations have to come ... at the 
company-level. Younger executives with more open-minded ideas. I think it has to 
happen, we have to give some time step. We have to allow fresh air in businesses, 
governments, politics, for us, so we can think that "well, they are going to seek 
consensus and will seek possible solutions." [...]. The problem is that we are witnessing 
reform after reform. On top of the cake, politicians are not like us. Here, both at the 
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company and in the bargaining, when we are wrong we rectify. (Labour Relations 
Manager, MNC Car manufacturer)  
As stated previously, many HR managers and Employers Organisations continued praise the 
role of the unions in terms of their contribution. There seemed to be a culture of regulation 
and dialogue which was likely to resist changes and to maintain some notion of historical 
memory and understanding of social dialogue. 
Finally much seems to hinge on the nature of the crisis and the question of what engenders 
employment and to see collective bargaining and labour regulation mechanisms as the main 
cause of Spain’s high unemployment is questionable and this means we need to push the 
discussion towards a broader debate on political economy. In the words of one of our 
interviewees and panellists: 
.. Because you have to keep in mind that, I've said it many times, there is no crisis but 
an overall crisis of the previous growth. Then, in Spain, the crisis is the crisis of growth 
to which I referred earlier. No European country increased by 60% the activity rate 
from 1994 to 2007 because the European increase was only of 16%. Of course, now 
there is a lot of unemployment, but why? Because of the previous and very important 
growth. At least, almost half, almost half of the current unemployment is the result of 
the exaggerated growth of the previous period. (Santos Ruesga, Academic) 
In this respect, the reform of collective bargaining and its tendency to reduce everything to 
the problem of cost and bureaucracy obscures a much deeper dilemma in the case of Spanish 
economic development.  It also obscures the curiously positive role social dialogue has 
played in recent years in Spain.  
 
3. Summary and Final thoughts  
The report tries to bring together some general trends and developments. It has focused on a 
range of predispositions and thoughts in relation to the reforms.  The report outlines the 
extent of the reforms but also some of the main points of impact. It is not a formal study of 
labour market structures and regulations: it is instead a review of perspectives and 
evaluations.  It has tended to focus on the management and employer respondents as well.  
The reasons for this are as follows.  One could argue whether the reforms are successful or 
not, and whether they are creating a broad shift in the culture and practices of the Spanish 
labour relations system. From our points of view the breadth and depth of regulation in terms 
of joint regulation is in decline and the impact on working conditions has been negative.  This 
a narrative that raises concerns as to the social and economic effects of de-regulation. 
However we have picked up some specific sets of concerns. The first is that many 
organisations and individuals in key employer bodies who have expressed concern at the 
effects the changes will have on social dialogue and consensus. There is a worry that these 
changes can undermine the main voice of trade unions and their role in working alongside 
various employers and the state in resolving major challenges to the economy.  The fabric of 
the social partners is under great stress.  Then there is the issue that many organisations – and 
management as well – will be under enormous pressure even if they appear to have a wider 
range of discretion and organisational choices.  They will be more open to litigation and less 
able to seek support from the workforce for their decisions. In the research we noted a real 
tension between different employer and management traditions: those with a tendency to 
support social dialogue and mutual collective bargaining have been under great pressure and 
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are concerned with the long term stability of the labour relations system.  What is more it 
appears that the state - which is undergoing tremendous restructuring itself - is not able to 
service and support labour relations and social partners as effectively as they did as 
individuals and organisations turn more often to the judicial and mediation – as well as 
arbitration - services of the state for more assistance and intervention. In effect, the state is 
brought back into labour relations in a more direct manner but without the necessary capacity 
to support labour relations.  The objectives of the reform were to push labour relations closer 
to the market away from the political – or so goes the rhetoric in official terms – but the 
outcomes may actually be more complex and more political as a consequence.    
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